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NOTE
BLOOD BANK AND BLOOD PRODUCTS MANUFACTURER
LIABILITY IN TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS CASES
AIDS forces us to confront our mortality, the limits of modern medicine,
and the contours of our compassion. How we respond is a measure of our
society and a reflection of our values and priorities.1
Can a blood bank or a blood products manufacturer be held liable if a
patient contracts AIDS through a transfusion of blood or a blood prod-
uct? And, if so, should the bank or manufacturer be held liable? As of
February 1989, approximately 200 cases touching on this issue were pend-
ing in the United States.2
Since the first cases of what has become known as Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) were diagnosed in 1981,3 the disease has
spread in epidemic proportions and has rapidly become the nation's "pri-
mary health concern."4 As recently as 1984, it was believed that AIDS
victims fell into one of four "at risk" categories - homosexual males
(71%), intravenous drug users (17%), Haitian immigrants (5%), and
hemophiliacs (1%).5 Since then a fifth category of victims, comprised of
1. George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REv. 771, 771 (1989).
2. Virginia Cope, Trends: Blood Bank Held Negligent in AIDS Case, TRIAL, Feb. 1989, at
96.
3. CDC Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 34 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 245, 248 (1985).
4. See Robert C. Greif, Comment, Hospital and Blood Bank Liability to Patients who
Contract AIDS Through Blood Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 875, 875-76 (1986).
5. CDC Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -United States, 32
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 688, 689 (1984).
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individuals who have contracted AIDS' through transfusions of blood and
blood products,' has emerged.
For this last category of AIDS victims, the road to legal recovery is a
difficult one. Transfusion-related AIDS victims usually advance three
theories of liability: strict products liability, breach of implied warranty
and negligence. Each of these theories presents substantial obstacles for
plaintiffs. These obstacles often result from the public policy choices
made by the state legislatures, which have decided to insulate blood
banks and blood products manufacturers by statute from sales-based lia-
bility." This Note explores the three theories of liability and the public
policies surrounding them that, more often than not, make these unfortu-
nate AIDS victims two-time losers.
I. AN AIDS CHRONOLOGY
Before exploring the theories of liability, it is useful to establish a chro-
nology of knowledge about AIDS in the medical and scientific communi-
ties and, perhaps more importantly, highlight when these discoveries were
made.
In the early 1980's, the scientific community identified intravenous
drug users, and to a much lesser degree hemophiliacs, as groups at risk
for AIDS. This prompted researchers to suspect that AIDS might be
transmitted through the blood.9 In December 1982, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control reported the diagnosis of an infant who had contracted
AIDS after receiving a transfusion of blood platelets, and subsequently
blood transfusions became the focus of the medical community's battle
against AIDS.'0
As of January 4, 1983, there were five reported cases of AIDS infection
among hemophiliacs, one possible blood transfusion-related case, and five
other cases related to blood products. This data prompted the Workgroup
to Identify Opportunities for the Prevention of AIDS to agree that mem-
6. There are three stages of HIV infection: (1) seropositivity, meaning that a person tests
positive for the presence of antibodies to the virus and is capable of transmitting the virus
and is vulnerable to developing AIDS, but remains asymptomatic and appears totally
healthy; (2) AIDS-related complex (ARC), a lesser form of AIDS which is infectious but not
life threatening; and (3) AIDS, which is always fatal. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire
Blood Bank, 818 P.2d 1056, 1057 n.2 (Wash. 1991) (citing Sharon L. Dieringer, Comment,
Blood Donation: A Gift of Life or a Death Sentence? 22 AKRON L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1989)).
7. For the purposes of this Note, the term "blood products" includes platelets, whole
blood, fresh frozen plasma, and blood coagulants.
8. See discussion infra part II,C.
9. Greif, supra note 4, at 877.
10. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing 31 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 652-54 (Dec. 10, 1982)), modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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bers of groups at high risk for contracting AIDS should be excluded from
donating blood.' However, the Workgroup failed to reach a consensus as
to the best method for screening donors. 2
On March 4, 1983, the United States Public Health Service issued rec-
ommendations for blood donor screening; a few weeks later the Food and
Drug Administration also issued recommendations.", The primary focus
of the recommendations issued by both organizations was on the distribu-
tion of informational pamphlets to potential donors in an effort to dis-
courage high risk groups from donating blood. Significantly, no recom-
mendations were then made about testing donated blood for
contamination.
14
In the Spring of 1984, it was discovered that a retrovirus, known as
HTLV-III/LAV, was the probable cause of AIDS. 15 This breakthrough fi-
nally created agreement among the medical and scientific communities
that the disease could be-spread by blood and blood products. On Febru-
ary 19, 1985, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a recom-
mendation that all blood facilities voluntarily begin testing blood for
AIDS as soon as testing supplies became commercially available. 16 By
May 1985, an "enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test ...
which screens for antibodies sensitive to HTLV-III" became commer-
cially available. 17 The FDA licensed the test on March 2, 1985.18 The
ELISA test has proven 98.6% effective in detecting exposure to AIDS,
and when coupled with a second test, the Western Blot Analysis, the rate
of detection rises to 100%. 11 This medical and scientific chronology pro-
11. Id. at 1051-52. The Workgroup was composed of representatives from several organi-
zations, including: the American Red Cross, the Centers for Disease Control, the National
Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the American Association of Blood
Bankers, the National Gay Task Force, and other blood banking and public health organiza-
tions. Id. at 1051.
12. Id. at 1052. The report summarizing the meeting noted that the "participants had
'differing perceptions' regarding not only the risk of AIDS from blood donation but also 'the
best approach for establishing altered guidelines for blood donation donor screening or test-
ing and donor restriction.'" Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
13. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted); Greif, supra note 4, at 879. This retrovirus is more commonly
referred to as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). For the purposes of this Note, it
will be referred to as the HIV virus.
16. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 1989).
17. Kozup, 663 F. Supp at 1052 (citation omitted).
18. 50 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985). The date of March 2, 1985 is very important for the purpose
of the ensuing litigation involving blood banks and blood products suppliers, especially on
the issue of the applicable standard of care in negligence cases. See discussion infra part IV.
19. 663 F. Supp. at 1052-53 (citations omitted). In fact, because of the possibility of false-
positive results using the ELISA test, positive ELISA result& must be confirmed by Western
Blot analysis or by an immunoflorescace assay (IFA). AIDS: The Legal Issues, Discussion
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vides the background against which the courts have examined the follow-
ing theories of liability.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT UNDER SECTION 402A OF THE
RESTATEMENT
A. The Sale versus Service Analysis
Transfusion-related AIDS victims often seek to impose liability under
the theory of strict liability in tort for the sale of an unreasonably danger-
ous product.20 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets
out the general applicability of this common law doctrine.21 Significantly,
strict liability under Section 402A applies only where there has been a
sale of a product and is specifically inapplicable to the provision of ser-
vices. In cases involving infection through blood or blood products, then,
the threshold issue is whether the provision of blood or blood products is
considered "a sale of a product" for the purposes of the strict liability
doctrine. 22
Almost unanimously, courts have held that when a hospital provides
blood or blood products to a paying patient as an incident to hospital
treatment, the provision is a service rather than a sale. Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital" is the leading case dealing with this issue. 24 In
Perlmutter, a patient brought an action against the treating hospital for
injuries he sustained after receiving a blood transfusion contaminated
Draft of the American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee 83 (1988). "These
tests are more expensive and time-consuming than the ELISA test, but are more specific for
HIV." Id. (citations omitted).
20. Strict products liability is not an alternative in Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
North Carolina, Virginia, or the District of Columbia, because the doctrine has not been
adopted either judicially or by statute in those jurisdictions. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY §§ 16:8-16:27 (3d ed. 1987).
21. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22. This is also the critical analysis when seeking to impose liability under the theory of
breach of implied warranty. See discussion infra part III.
23. 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954), reh'g denied, 125 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1955).
24. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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with hepatitis and jaundice.25 The plaintiff alleged that a "sale" of the
blood had taken place within the meaning of the New York Sales Act (as
then in force). 26 He alleged that as a consequence an implied warranty of
merchantability had attached to the sale, which was breached by the hos-
pital when it provided him with contaminated blood. 7
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court in Perlmutter reasoned
that because a hospital is devoted to the care and healing of the sick, the
predominant purpose of the contract between a hospital and its patients
is the provision of services. The court held that this purpose predomi-
nates regardless of whether the patient is charged separately for "healing
materials":
That the property or title to certain items of medical material may be trans-
ferred, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during the course of
medical treatment does not serve to make each such transaction a sale....
It has long been recognized that, when service predominates, and transfer of
personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the trans-
action is not deemed a sale .... 28
Nearly every state court that has confronted this issue has followed
Perlmutter, at least with respect to actions against hospitals in blood con-
tamination cases.29
Although the blood-borne disease at issue in Perlmutter was hepatitis,
the court's analysis should apply with equal force to AIDS cases. As one
commentator has noted, significant similarities exist between AIDS and
serum hepatitis: both are blood-borne, both were initially of unknown ori-
gin, and both were originally thought to be undetectable in blood.30 In
fact, just as "[c]ourts denying recovery for transfusion transmitted hepa-
titis have premised their decisions upon the fact that in each case at the
time of transfusion hepatitis was undetectable," many of the courts deny-
25. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 793.
26. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 96 (Consol. 1941) (repealed 1962) (now codified at N.Y. U.C.C.
LAW § 2-317 (Consol. 1981)).
27. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 793.
28. Id. at 794 (citations omitted). Most courts follow this "predominant purpose" test in
analyzing the distinction between services and sales of goods. See generally 1 BARRY L. ZA-
RETSKY ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE GUIDE 3.02[1][d][ii] (1991).
29. Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 532 A.2d 1081, 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987). See
generally, St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975); Fisher v. Sibley Memo-
rial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979); White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d
19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968); Holder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d
205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. Ct. App.
1967); Weber v. Charity Hosp., 487 So. 2d 148 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Diblee v. Dr. W.H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961); Foster v. Memorial Hosp.-
Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Ctr., Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50
(Wis. 1964).
30. Greif, supra note 4, at 881.
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ing recovery for transfusion-related HIV have likewise done so because, at
the time of the transfusion the HIV virus was similarly undetectable in
blood. 1
B. Blood Shield Statutes - An Absolute Defense to Sales-Based
Liability?
Today most courts do not have to venture into the "sale versus service"
analysis wheri confronted with blood contamination cases because the is-
sue has been preempted in large measure by state statutes. A great major-
ity of states have enacted "blood shield statutes" which expressly charac-
terize blood transfusions as services 2 or explicitly state that blood
transfusions will not be subject to strict liability." These statutes, as in-
terpreted by the courts, effectively grant hospitals, blood banks and blood
31. Id. at 881 n.28 (citing Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118,
120-21 (Colo. 1983); Fogo v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 137 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1131 (D.C. 1979)).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1986); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-22-104(2) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5),.(6) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-28 (Michie 1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1985 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111
/2, para. 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2(a) (Burns 1990); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-3701 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Repl. Vol.
1991)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.2797 (West 1991), LA. CIv. CODE ANN. at 2322.1 (West Supp.
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 18-402 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Law Co-op 1984 &
CuM. Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-1 (Law Co-op. 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001 (1990); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 460.010(2) (Repl. Vol. 1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Anderson Repl. Vol.
1990 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300(1) (Repl. Vol. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (Rev. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-2-316(5) (Repl. Vol. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (Repl. Vol. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §
31.1-297 (Michie 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1991);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.31(2) (West 1989); WYo. STAT. § 34.1-2-316(c)(iv) (1991).
33. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-802 (Michie Repl.
Vol. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104(2) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-28 (Michie 1982);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-51 (Repl. Vol. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111 /2, para. 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2(a) (Burns Repl. Vol. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1991); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2322.1 (West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402(1) (Repl. Vol.
1990); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.9121(3) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
431.069 (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-103 to -104 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §
460.010(2) (Repl. Vol. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (Repl. Vol. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-10-5 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (Repl. Vol. 1978); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8333(a) (1982); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.003(a) (West
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.31(2) (West 1989).
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products manufacturers absolute immunity from sales-based liability,3 4
including strict liability. 5
Samson v. Greenville Hospital System illustrates the effect of these
statutes. Helen Samson contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion she
received while a patient in a hospital operated by the Greenville Hospital
System in South Carolina. She brought a strict liability action in federal
district court against both the hospital and the blood supplier, the Caro-
lina-Georgia Blood Center.37 'The district court certified to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina the question of whether blood is a product for
purposes of the strict liability doctrine in light of South Carolina's blood
shield statute.3 8 The supreme court held that the language of the blood
shield statute "clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend for
blood to be classified as a product. Furthermore, this construction is con-
sistent with the underlying purpose of the blood shield statute, namely,
to facilitate a readily available supply of blood by limiting liability to de-
fects resulting from negligence." 39
Despite decisions like Samson, it is important to examine carefully the
wording of each state's blood shield statute. Some blood shield statutes
were expressly enacted to address only the threat of serum hepatitis,40
and it was not until after it was discovered that the HIV virus was trans-
mittable through the blood that legislatures amended these statutes to
deal with potential AIDS liability. Courts have held that these amend-
ments are not to be applied retroactively.41 Consequently, plaintiffs who
34. Negligence, however, still is a viable theory of recovery for transfusion-related AIDS
victims. See discussion infra part IV.
35. Greif, supra note 4, at 883.
36. 377 S.E.2d 311 (S.C. 1989).
37. Id. at 311.
38. Id. The statute provides:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a
contract for the sale, procurement, processing, distribution or use of human tissues
such as corneas, bones or organs, whole blood, plasma, blood products or blood deriv-
atives. Such human tissues, whole blood, plasma, blood products or blood derivatives
shall not be considered commodities subject to sale or barter and the transplanting,
injection, transfusion or other transfer of such substances into the human body shall
be considered a medical service.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (emphasis added).
39. Samson, 377 S.E.2d at 312; see also Rogers v. Miles Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346 (Wash.
1991) (common law doctrine of strict liability inapplicable to blood and blood products).
40. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Md. 1987) (discussing MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402); Hansen v. Mercy Hosp., 570 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1977) (dis-
cussing COLo. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104), aff'd.sub nom. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v.
Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978); Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 532 A.2d 1081
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (discussing MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402); Howell v.
Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990) (discussing WASH. REV.
1992]
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received contaminated transfusions before the amendments are not
barred by the blood shield statutes from bringing strict liability actions.
For example, in Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., the plaintiff con-
tracted AIDS-related complex (ARC)43 from a transfusion of Konyne, a
blood-coagulation-factor concentrate she received in 1983 for childbirth
complications."' The plaintiff sued the manufacturer under the theories
of strict liability in tort and breach of implied warranty; she later
amended her complaint to add a negligence count.4" The defendant ar-
gued that Maryland's blood shield statute (as then in force) exempted
blood and blood products from strict products liability.46 However, noting
that the statute was not amended to deal with potential AIDS liability
until 1986, the court interpreted the statute as shielding blood providers
only in cases of injuries from the serum hepatitis virus.47 Accordingly, the
court found that "there was no legislative intent to shield manufacturers
of blood and blood products from strict liability [for AIDS transmission
cases] until the 1986 amendments. 48
C. A Matter of Public Policy - Do Blood Banks and Blood Products
Manufacturers Deserve the Same Protection as Hospitals?
Even if no statutory bar to strict liability exists, the common law may
nonetheless bar a plaintiff's recovery by dictating that blood banks and
blood products manufacturers provide a service rather than sell a prod-
uct. Some courts have followed Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,9
holding that blood banks and blood products manufacturers, like hospi-
CODE ANN. § 70.54.120); cf. Cutler v. Graduate Hosp., 717 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(discussing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8333).
42. 675 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991).
43. See supra note 6.
44. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1468.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1475. At the time of the suit, Maryland's blood shield statute provided:
A person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses whole blood or any
substance derived from blood for injection or transfusion into an individual for any
purpose may not be held liable for the virus of serum hepatitis under:
(1) Strict liability in tort;
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or
(3) The implied warranty of fitness.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (Repl. Vol. 1990). Since then, the statute has been
amended with few significant changes and recodified at section 5-373 in the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings of the state's code. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRAC. § 5-373 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
47. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1476.
48. Id. at 1477.
49. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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tals, are service providers and that therefore no sale takes place for the
purposes of the strict liability doctrine. 50
Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank51 is an example of
such a decision. The plaintiff tested positive for the HIV virus after re-
ceiving a transfusion of blood supplied by the Spokane & Inland Empire
Blood Bank on October 8, 1984.52 Although the court determined that the
1985 amendment including AIDS within the scope of Washington's blood
shield statute did not apply retroactively,53 it nevertheless denied recov-
ery. The public policy reasons advanced by the court for classifying the
transaction as a service, and for refusing to extend the doctrine of strict
liability to the provision of blood and blood products by entities other
than hospitals, are typical. The court stated:
The purposes of strict liability are not furthered when applied to blood and
blood products .... First, the societal need to ensure an affordable, ade-
quate blood supply furnishes a persuasive reason for distinguishing between
victims of defective blood and victims of other defective products. Second,
strict liability cannot provide an incentive to promote all possible accident
prevention at a time when there was no possible means of screening the
blood for HIV. Third, while the producers may be in a better position to
spread the costs, it is not in society's best interest to have the price of a
transfusion reflect its true costs. In addition, both the blood bank and the
hospital are in the distribution chain of providing blood to patients as a
service. Although the blood bank does charge a fee for the blood, the blood
bank is a nonprofit entity providing a service for the community.54
It is interesting to contrast the Howell court's treatment of this issue
with the treatment of the same issue in Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc.5
In Doe, the defendant had argued that Perlmutter and the line of cases
following it established that providing blood and blood products is a ser-
50. See, e.g., Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 532 A.2d 1081, 1088 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987) (following the Perlmutter theory and declining to make a distinction between
hospitals and blood suppliers); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d
815, 821 (Wash. 1990) (declining to draw a distinction between blood banks and hospitals).
But cf., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1466, 1478 (D. Md. 1987) (common law does
not create a shield for blood and blood products), aff'd, 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991); Russell
v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) ("We believe
there is a distinction between a suit against a blood bank as opposed to a hospital ... ".),
modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Miles Lab., Inc. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1121-22 (Md.
1989) (holding that strict liability is not applicable in a suit against commercial supplier of
blood products due to policy considerations and finding that blood has unique life-sus-
taining qualities).
51. 785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990).
52. Id. at 817.
53. Id. at 820.
54. Id. at 822.
55. 675 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991); see supra notes
42-48 and accompanying text.
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vice rather than the sale of a product,6 therefore exempting it from strict
liability. The Doe court disagreed, holding that Perlmutter and its prog-
eny were distinguishable because in the instant case "the defendant...
is a producer of blood or blood products and not a hospital."5 7 The court
explained:
A transaction whereby a blood bank, which is engaged in the business of
collecting and distributing blood, transfers the title to the commodity to a
patient for a consideration, is unquestionably a "sale." . . . Nor can it be
questioned that the commodity in question - blood supplied for the pur-
pose of a blood transfusion - is a product "intended for human consump-
tion" quite as much as is a vaccine ... or a food product .... s
The defendant in Doe had also argued that comment k to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the "unavoidably unsafe products
exemption," should apply to the sale of blood and blood products.5 9 Re-
jecting this argument, the court stated that it was "not prepared to find
that HTLV-III carrying blood presents a 'reasonable danger' as Comment
k requires . . . . The best view is to consider blood containing in-
detectible [sic] diseases to be a defective product and therefore that strict
liability is applicable."6
56. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1477.
57. Id. at 1478 (emphasis added). The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff's strict products liability claim because the court viewed the trans-
action as the sale of a product under the common law of Maryland. However, the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for breach
of warranty and failure to warn. Id. at 1482.
58. Id. at 1478 (quoting Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 118-19
(Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., concurring)); see also Hansen v. Mercy Hosp., 570 P.2d 1309, 1310
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) ("The sales aspect of hospital care is only incidental to the predomi-
nating service function ... but in the case of a blood bank the converse is true."), aff'd sub
nom. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978). It should
be pointed out, however, that the Hansen court applied the pre-AIDS amendment version
of Colorado's blood shield statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (1987). See supra notes 31-
47 and accompanying text.
59. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1479. Comment k to § 402A excludes from strict liability:
[Piroducts, drugs in particular, which in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use .... The
seller of such products ... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but appar-
ently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); see also Miles Lab., Inc. v. Doe, 556
A.2d 1107, 1116-20 (Md. 1989).
60. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1479. Shortly after rendering this decision, the district judge
reconsidered and certified the strict liability question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
See Miles Lab., 556 A.2d at 1109. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the "prepara-
tion and supplying of Konyne ... constituted a sale," thereby invoking the strict liability
doctrine of § 402A. Id. at 1117; see also Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 190 (4th Cir.
1991).
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The Doe court then examined the same public policy issues the Howell
court addressed, but with strikingly opposite results:
Those who choose to operate in the economic marketplace play by the rules
applicable to all.
The arguments in favor of strict products liability apply as persuasively
to blood and blood products as they do to any other product. First, there is
no reason why victims of defective blood should bear the costs where vic-
tims of other defective products do not. Second, strict liability would pro-
vide the incentive to promote all possible accident prevention, for it is a
rational business decision to keep costs down. Third, the producers are in a
better position to spread the costs than are individual consumers. Finally, it
makes for a more efficient allocation of social resources when the price of a"
transfusion of blood or blood products reflects its true costs.6 1
Examined in light of the goals of the strict liability doctrine, the Doe
court's decision is more persuasive. The fundamental goal of strict liabil-
ity is "to insure that the costs of injuries . . are borne by the manufac-
turers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves. '62 The doctrine is tem-
pered by the fact that "[s]trict tort liability principles are not applicable
under comment k [to section 402A] when, at the time of distribution of
such products, they contain a then unknown and unknowable infectious
agent undetectable by any available scientific test."6 "
Blood shield statutes were enacted to grant hospitals, blood banks and
blood products manufacturers absolute immunity from sales-based liabil-
ity in order to "maintain the public health and welfare, t o ensure suffi-
cient blood supplies, and to enable medical treatment and discovery to
advance. '64 These statutes served a logical and necessary purpose when
the HIV virus was indeed undiscoverable in blood, because "[w]ithout
statutory immunity, hospitals and blood banks would face enormous ex-
pense if held liable for the costs of transfusion-related AIDS contagion,
especially since detection and elimination were not medically possi-
ble. .. ."65 However, to continue to rely on this argument to reject strict
products liability claims which are based on transfusions received after
61. Doe, 675 F. Supp. at 1480.
62. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
63. Miles Lab., Inc., 556 A.2d at 1121 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land recognized four factors that are usually considered in cases which hold that blood and
blood products are not unreasonably dangerous under comment k: 1) the nonexistence of
any scientific test capable of detecting the viral agent which contaminated the blood at the
time of the injury; 2) the great utility of the product; 3) the lack of any substitute for the
product; and 4) the relatively small risk of the disease being transmitted by the product. Id.
at 1118.
64. Greif, supra note 4, at 885, (footnote omitted).
65. Id.
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March 1985 is to ignore current scientific and medical reality.6 Given the
fact that it is now possible to detect the HIV virus in the blood with
almost 100% accuracy,67 blood and blood products cannot be considered
"unavoidably unsafe products" under comment k to section 402A. Ac-
cordingly, an absolute statutory shield to liability is no longer
appropriate.
Moreover it seems equally disingenuous to label blood products manu-
facturers, and to a lesser extent blood banks, "service providers" when
they are undoubtedly "in the business of collecting and distributing
blood"6 8 for compensation. As one court commented in 1966 when decid-
ing a transfusion-related hepatitis case, "[iut seems to us a distortion to
take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service,
and then employ this transformed material in erecting the framework of a
major policy decision."6 " Continuing to provide absolute sales-based im-
munity for such entities runs contrary to the goals of the strict liability
doctrine.
III. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes liability on a
seller in cases in which goods sold do not conform to certain minimum
standards, provided that the seller is "a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind."7 0 Section 2-315 imposes liability when the goods sold are
66. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
68. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
69. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(distinguishing between blood banks and hospitals despite authority to the contrary), aff'd
as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
70. Section 2-314 states:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
quire; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label
if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
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not fit for the particular purpose for which they are sold. 71 Because sec-
tions 2-314 and 2-315 apply only to the sale of goods, it must be deter-
mined whether blood and blood products can be considered goods, sub-
jecting the "seller" of such goods to liability under the Uniform
Commercial Code in transfusion-related AIDS cases.
7 2
In drawing a distinction between services and sales of goods to deter-
mine the applicability of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, most
courts apply the predominant purpose test.7 1 "If the primary function of
the contract is the rendition of services for a price, the contract is a com-
mon law contract for services. If the focus of the contract is on the end
product, the contract is an Article 2 contract. 74
As previously discussed, most states have enacted blood shield statutes
which specifically provide that the supply or transfusion of blood and
blood products is a service and not a sale.7 5 While most of these statutes
effectively create an absolute bar to sales-based liability for blood banks
and blood products manufacturers, 78 some states' statutes (including Vir-
ginia's) may allow recovery under the theory of breach of implied war-
ranty when defects in the blood are detectable by established medical
procedures. 7 7 Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, "a focus upon
medical standards looks to a negligence cause of action, rather than one
of implied warranty which looks to liability without fault. '78 To make
matters worse, many courts have treated actions for breach of implied
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1991).
71. Section 2-315 states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
Id. § 2-315.
72. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
73. See generally 1 ZARETSKY, supra note 27, at 3.02[1][d][ii].
74. Michael J. Herbert, Commercial Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 681, 682 (1991.).
75. See supra note 32.
76. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
77. Virginia's blood shield statute provides:
No action for implied warranty shall lie for the procurement, processing, distribution
or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives. . . for the purpose
of injecting, transfusing or transplanting any of them into the human body except
where any defects or impurities in the said whole blood, plasma, blood products,
blood derivatives . . . are detectable by the use of established medical and techno-
logical procedures employed pursuant to the standards of local medical practice.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (Michie 1985) (emphasis added).
78. Greif, supra note 4, at 888 n.62. Because no showing of fault is required, a cause of
action for breach of warranty is the "next best thing" to a cause of action for strict liability
in those states which have not adopted § 402A. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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warranty and strict liability as one and the same,"' and have further
clouded the issue by inserting what amounts to a negligence analysis into
the equation. s0
The decision in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Doe"1 illustrates this confu-
sion. The case involved actions brought on behalf of patients who con-
tracted AIDS through blood transfusions against the suppliers of blood
and blood products. s2 Although the court held that the provision of blood
and blood products constituted sales under the Uniform Commercial
Code, it nonetheless held that a breach of warranty action could not be
sustained:
where the claim for strict tort liability under § 402A fails under comment k
- that when, because of an unknown and unknowable virus contained in
the blood product which is undetectable [sic] by any available scientific test,
the product is incapable of being made entirely safe, yet must be marketed
due to the profound and essential public need for it.
... To otherwise hold is to fasten upon the blameless seller of a vitally
essential lifesaving product a wholly unreasonable liability certain to prove
antithetical to the general public interest. 3
The reasoning of the court in Miles Laboratories is flawed for one sim-
ple reason. Under the theory of breach of implied warranty, the blood
supplier's negligence or fault should not enter into the liability calculus.
As the Supreme Court of Florida held in Green v. American Tobacco
Co.,s 4 "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for
knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to
his liability on the theory of implied warranty." 85 Under the implied war-
79. See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[Tjhe
current doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability in tort are but two labels for the
same legal right and remedy."), modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Miles Lab., Inc. v.
Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1123 (Md. 1989) (implied warranty claims cannot be sustained where
the claim for strict tort liability fails).
80. One court wrote:
[A] plaintiff can state a cause of action against a blood bank for breach of implied
warranty, but can only recover for injuries if they were caused by the failure to detect
or remove a deleterious substance capable of detection or removal. Admittedly, this
language goes right to the threshold of a suit for negligence, and this apparent anom-
aly in legal theory has been recognized before .... However, the practical effect of
the difference between azi action in negligence and one in implied warranty when
dealing with a product "unavoidably unsafe" is to shift the burden of proof.
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (cita-
tions omitted) (hepatitis contamination case) (superseded by statute as stated in Sicuranza
v. Northwest Florida Blood Ctr., Inc., 582 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
81. 556 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1989).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1123-25.
84. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
85. Id. at 170-71.
[Vol. 26:519
BLOOD BANK LIABILITY
ranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code the critical inquiry is
whether a sale of goods has occurred by a merchant who deals in goods of
that kind."6 Once this threshold requirement has been met, proof of a
defect in the product should suffice to impose liability upon the seller.
As seen in the strict liability analysis, discussed above in Section II,
absent a statutory shield expressly stating that providing blood and blood
products is a service some courts have been willing to hold that blood
banks and blood products manufacturers do indeed sell a product.
8 7
Moreover, blood banks and blood products manufacturers are unques-
tionably merchants dealing in "goods of the kind" (in these cases, blood
and blood products)., s With this point established, proof of a defect in
the goods should be sufficient to establish liability.8 9 Clearly, under any
test for defectiveness, blood or blood products contaminated with the
HIV virus must constitute defective products. As the court in Roberts v.
Suburban Hospital Ass'n9 O stated, "[i]f the blood is contaminated with
an infectious virus, it is just as unmerchantable and unfit and unreasona-
bly dangerous whether the virus produces hepatitis or AIDS."'" Conse-
quently, blood banks and blood product manufacturers who distribute
goods contaminated with the HIV virus should be held liable under the
theory of breach of implied warranty.
IV. NEGLIGENCE
As a result of the courts' and legislatures' reluctance to expose-blood
banks and blood products manufacturers to sales-based liability, a cause
of action for negligence is often a plaintiff's best hope for recovery. To
recover under a negligence cause of action a transfusion-related AIDS vic-
tim must prove that a standard of care existed, that the defendant's con-
duct fell below that standard, and that this conduct was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.92 Plaintiffs who have contracted AIDS
through transfusions of blood and blood products have alleged negligence
in both blood testing and donor screening.
9 3
86. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1991).
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Md. 1987).
88. Id. at 1478 (citing Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966), aff'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967)).
89. PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 3.15 (McGraw-
Hill 1981).
90. 532 A.2d 1081 (Md. 1987).
91. Id. at 1089.
92. Greif, supra note 4, at 889.
93. Id. An interesting by-product of this litigation has been a controversy over whether
plaintiffs can discover information about blood donors. See, e.g., Borzillieri v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross,
139 F.R.D. 95 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); Peter B.
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Blood banks and blood products manufacturers are usually held to a
professional standard of care, "established by looking to the conduct of
the industry or profession in similar circumstances as of [the date of the
injury]."9 ' In Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services,95 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that the transfusion of blood was a medical
service and that the Red Cross, as a blood collector, should be treated as
a professional.99 The court then applied this professional standard of care
to the Red Cross, stating, "[imn a professional negligence cause of action,
the standard of care that the plaintiff must prove is that the professional
failed to conform to the generally recognized and accepted practices in his
profession."9
The cornerstone to recovery for negligence in transfusion-related AIDS
cases lies in establishing what the medical and scientific communities
knew about AIDS, and more importantly, when they knew it.98 This
knowledge, or the lack thereof, determines the applicable standard of
care. To quote the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, "the crucial
date is not when plaintiff's decedent was diagnosed as having AIDS, but
when he actually contracted the disease. . . ."I' In most of the reported
cases the plaintiffs received their transfusions before the medical and sci-
entific communities had developed a reliable method for diagnosing the
HIV virus in blood and, primarily for this reason, recovery was denied.' 0
Kunin, Note, Transfusion-Related AIDS Litigation: Permitting Limited Discovery from
Blood Donors in Single Donor Cases, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1991).
94. McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (E.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d
219 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. Quintana v. United Blood Servs., 811 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert.
granted, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 350 (Colo. 1991). In Quintana, the court held that Colorado's
blood shield statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (Repl. Vol. 1987), "affirms that general
negligence standards, not product liability standards, shall apply in determining the liability
of a blood bank supplying tainted blood." Id. at 429. The court, against the great weight of
authority, was "not persuaded that the blood banking industry possesses the professional
characteristics which justify this preferred position." Id. at 431 (emphasis in original).
95. 377 S.E.2d 323 (S.C. 1989).
96. Id. at 326.
97. Id.
98. See discussion supra part I.
99. McKee v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 224 n.3 (6th Cir. 1989). Another view would
be to look at the date of the blood donation as the crucial date for determining the standard
of care.
100. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991) (1983 transfusion);
Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1990) (1981 transfusion); McKee v.
Cutter Lab., Inc., 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (pre-1983 transfusion); Jones v. Miles Lab.,
Inc., 887 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1989) (contaminated donations made in January and February
1983); McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d 219 (6th
Cir. 1989) (Fall 1983 transfusion); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.
1987) (January 1983 transfusion), modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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A leading case is Kozup v. Georgetown University.10 1 Susan Kozup was,
admitted to the High Risk Obstetrical Unit of Georgetown University
Hospital on December 26, 1982, when it became apparent that she would
experience childbirth complications. She gave birth to a son, Matthew, on
January 10, 1983. During the three days following his birth, Matthew re-
ceived three blood transfusions that were later discovered to be contami-
nated with the HIV virus. Matthew died on July 10, 1986, from AIDS-
related complications, and his parents and sister brought suit against the
hospital and the American Red Cross.
10 2
The Kozup court began its analysis with a chronology of medical
knowledge about AIDS, from before Matthew's birth until the discovery
and marketing of the ELISA test in 1985.103 The court then addressed
plaintiffs' allegations that the American Red Cross negligently failed to:
(1) screen donors who belonged to high-risk groups; (2) implement tests
that would eliminate blood contaminated with AIDS; and (3) warn plain-
tiffs of the dangerous condition of the transfused blood.104 The Kozups'
primary allegation was that as of October of 1982, when the American
Red Cross collected the blood that Matthew received, the organization
knew or should have known that AIDS could be transmitted through
blood. 15
The court flatly rejected this theory, noting that the earliest diagnosis
of a possible transfusion-related case of AIDS occurred in December 1982,
two months after the American Red Cross collected the contaminated
blood that Matthew received.'016 In order for donor screening and blood
testing to have prevented Matthew's infection, these measures would
have had to have been implemented by October 1982. However, at that
early date no organization in the country, "including blood banks, hospi-
tals, or federal health care regulators," recommended donor screening or
blood testing.10 7 In light of this evidence, the court held that the Red
Cross had not fallen below the then-applicable standard of care. 08
101. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. 1048.
102. Id. at 1050.
103. Id. at 1051-53.
104. Id. at 1055-56.
105. Id. at 1056.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id.; accord Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 1991) (defendants
complied with the standard of care as it existed in September 1983); Valdiviez v. United
States, 884 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1989) (self-screening of donors not negligent in 1984, as
this was the method then recommended by the Centers for Disease Control); Knight v. De-
partment of the Army, 757 F. Supp. 790, 794 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (expert's testimony that
transmission of AIDS through blood a "theoretic problem" in 1984, therefore no duty to
warn).
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One recent case has hinted at what might be an appropriate standard
of care after 1985, at least with regard to self-screening methods for do-
nors. In Crandall v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.,109 the plaintiff's
husband allegedly received a contaminated transfusion in April 1987, and
died of AIDS-related complications in January 1988.110 Reversing the cir-
cuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the blood bank on the
issue of negligent donor screening, the district court of appeals held that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the donor question-
naire should have inquired of the donors whether they had a recent medi-
cal history of the following symptoms: "fever, skin eruption, aching joints
and muscles, weakness, lymph gland enlargement, sore throat, gastroin-
testinal symptoms, headache, or sensitivity to light." '111
The HIV virus was identified as the cause of AIDS in the spring of
1984,112 and the Food and Drug Administration licensed the ELISA test
to diagnose the virus in blood on March 2, 1985.113 Because of the lack of
medical and scientific knowledge about AIDS and the absence of an accu-
rate diagnostic test prior to 1985, it remains practically impossible for
plaintiffs who received contaminated transfusions before 1985 to establish
that the then-applicable standard of care was breached by a failure to
test donated blood. However, the licensing and commercial availability of
the ELISA test in early 1985, in conjunction with the FDA's recommen-
dation that same year that donated blood be screened for the HIV virus,
should establish a medical standard of care on which to base negligence
actions for subsequent transfusions.1 1 4 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has stated, "we believe that the FDA's recommendation of February
19, 1985, that blood facilities begin testing all donated blood as soon as
testing supplies became commercially available imposed a duty on [the
blood bank] to test all its blood supplies for antibodies to the AIDS vi-
rus." '115 Interestingly, in the unreported case Osborn v. Irwin Memorial
Blood Bank,"" a jury found a blood bank negligent for not screening a
blood transfusion given to a patient in February, 1983.17 Nevertheless,
109. 581 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
110. Id. at 594.
111. Id. at 595. It should be noted that an expert witness for the plaintiff suggested that
these procedures be used in conjunction with the testing of the donated blood, a procedure
which was already conducted by the blood bank. Id.
112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
113. 50 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985).
114. Greif, supra note 4, at 891.
115. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 1989).
116. No. 88-891642 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1988) (discussed in Cope, supra
note 2).
117. Id. Another court held that the fact that a screening test for AIDS was not available
until 1985 did not foreclose a claim of negligence for a 1984 transfusion and that plaintiff
was entitled to discovery on the issue of screening procedures. Doe v. University Hosp., 561
N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (1990).
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because of the state of medical and scientific knowledge in 1983, it seems
far more likely that the Spring of 1985 will prove to be the crucial date
for plaintiffs seeking to recover in negligence for AIDS-contaminated
transfusions. 118 Only after that date can it conclusively be established
that a failure to test donated blood for the HIV virus constitutes
negligence.
V. CONCLUSION
Transfusion-related AIDS victims usually assert three theories for re-
covery against blood banks and blood products manufacturers - strict
liability in tort for the sale of an unreasonably dangerous product, breach
of implied warranty, and negligence. However, the blood shield statutes
enacted by most states make it difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to
recover under the strict liability and breach of warranty theories. These
statutes, passed or amended to deal with AIDS liability at a time when
the HIV virus was undetectable in blood, continue to insulate blood
banks and blood products manufacturers from sales-based liability. This
protection persists in spite of the fact that since at least 1985 the HIV
virus has been nearly 100% detectable in blood.
Although absolute protection for these entities may have been logical or
desirable when the HIV virus was undetectable in the blood, the better
view based on current medical and scientific knowledge would be to allow
post-1985 recipients of contaminated transfusions to recover under the
theories of strict liability and breach of implied warranty. This would
place the burden on the blood banks and blood products manufacturers
to ensure the safety of the products they distribute. Moreover, courts and
legislatures should distinguish between hospitals, blood banks, and blood
products manufacturers. Blood banks, and especially blood products
manufacturers, are active players in the economic marketplace, selling
goods rather than providing services.
Unless this change of attitude takes place, the only cause of action that
is not effectively preempted for transfusion-related AIDS victims is one
sounding in negligence. For pre-1985 transfusion recipients, it has proved
difficult to establish a breach of the then-applicable standard of care.
But, for those plaintiffs who received transfusions after 1985, recovery
should be facilitated by the imposition of stricter standards for donor
screening and blood testing.
Dana J. Finberg
118. One court found May 1985 to be the crucial date. Valdiviez v. United States, 884
F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1989).
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